In this article, I trace the emergence of gender segregation within contemporary Salafism, focusing on Egypt as a case study to examine the interaction between textual hermeneutics, ideological cross-pollination and political competition. Drawing on two Egyptian Salafi magazines, alongside a variety of pamphlets and lay-oriented works by Salafi and non-Salafi authors alike, I challenge a majority view that claims gender segregation as a long-established religious principle and practice, while historically contextualizing a minority view that gender segregation arose out of contemporary political calculations. Specifically, although the core anxieties of women's presence in public were not new, the attempt to comprehensively regulate women's presence in state institutions and on mass transportation was a response to contemporary intellectual trends, particularly the project of State Feminism and leading Muslim Brotherhood thinkers during the Nasser period (1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962)(1963)(1964)(1965)(1966)(1967)(1968)(1969)(1970), and to political competition with the Brotherhood during the 1970s.
who argued that women not only must cover their head, face and hands but also must observe strict gender segregation in public.3 How did this drastic change occur and what implications did it have for the access of Salafi women to education and professional employment?4
Legal historians of Salafism, most prominently Khaled Abou el-Fadl and Adis Duderija, paint a historically static picture of the Salafi views of gender segregation by focusing on the relationship between textual methodology and gender practices.5 Similarly, anthropologists who study gender segregation assume this model of gender relations to be sui generis.6 More broadly, the This is not to assume that all Salafi women seek education or employment, only to note that many do for reasons of personal edification, economic subsistence and power relations within their marriage. study of Salafism disproportionately centers on either elite questions of legal methodology7 and political participation,8 or on local ritual practice9 and ethical self-cultivation.10 An examination of the legal debates over women's public presence in Egypt during the twentieth century, by contrast, highlights the intersection of law, political competition and social practice in the formation of new models of gender relations. In order to bring Salafi legal interpretation of women's public status together with related political, social and economic shifts, I will focus on the negotiation of this question at one key site, Egypt.11 Though frequently cast as a secondary participant in Salafi intellectual development, this regional religious and cultural heavyweight boasted two prominent Salafi organizations throughout much of the 20th century: al-Jamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya li'l-'Āmilīn b'ilKitāb wa'l-Sunna (henceforth the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya) (f. 1912) and Anṣār alSunna al-Muḥammadiyya (henceforth Anṣār al-Sunna), whose early members had belonged to the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya before leaving to found a separate organization in 1926.12 Equally important, Egypt's population has long exceeded Anecdotally, this period also witnessed a vast expansion in pamphlets and longer works published in Saudi Arabia inveighing against the dangers of gender mixing. 12
The historical relationship between Anṣār al-Sunna and the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya requires further research. One key tension between the two organizations revolves around the latter's Salafi credentials, particularly the training of the JS's founder, al-Subkī, within the Maliki madhhab. According to the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya, al-Subkī adopted a Salafi approach on matters of creed (ʿaqīda) and a Maliki approach on secondary questions (al-furūʿ (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , the former published by leading figures within the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya and the latter the official mouthpiece of Anṣār al-Sunna.15 In order to contextualize these periodicals, I also draw on a variety of pamphlets and scholarly works by leading Salafi and Brotherhood thinkers, Egyptian and non-Egyptian, that were published in Egypt both prior to and during the 1970s.
Drawing on these underutilized sources, I show that changing laws of female modesty and comprehensive legislation of public space did not emerge out of preexisting interpretative differences or from changing hermeneutical approaches. Instead, the expansion of gender-segregation was a product of the reemerged as an independent entity in 1973, when it returned to publishing al- Tawḥīd All citations from al-Tawḥīd magazine come from a digital version formatted for the "Shamela" Islamic text program as a .bok file. The authenticity of this reproduction of this period and the accuracy of page numbers has been verified to the extent possible through a comparison with original copies of the publication stretching from 1979 to 1981. The Anṣār al-Sunna website contains a link for this file: <http://ansarsonna.com/pageother. php?catsmktba=222>. Often, the Shamela version provides article-specific page numbers, but in some cases, it does not. In the latter instance, I cite the page of the article rather than its place within the magazine issue. The magazine also frequently provided the Ḥijrī month but not the Gregorian month. I also provide a speculative Gregorian date based on the assumption that the magazine was published on the first day of the Ḥijrī month.
intersection of increased female education and employment, intellectual cross-fertilization with both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasserist project of State Feminism,16 and post-1975 political competition with the Brotherhood. To trace these changes, I highlight the shifting bounds of the legal category of "flaunting" (al-tabarruj) and the growing prominence of the category of gender mixing (ikhtilāṭ al-jinsayn).
While the basic principles of gender mixing (and its opposite, gender segregation) are clear, those of flaunting are opaque. Our most detailed view comes from the cover of a 1980 pamphlet, published in Egypt, entitled Flaunting and the Danger of Women Joining Men in the Their Workplace (al-Tabarruj wa Khaṭar Mushārakat al-Marʾa li'l-Rajul fī Maydān ʿAmalih). The Saudi Salafi scholar ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz (and his illustrator) sought to communicate the danger at hand: the "flaunting woman" was a brunette with flowing hair and a fraying blouse. While luscious locks covered her face, a tear in the fabric across her neckline, alongside a bottle and glass of wine, and a pile of cards, confirmed her moral depravity. Although Ibn Bāz would have liked for his readers to believe that his use of this category flowed directly and unequivocally from the Quran and Sunna, the story is significantly more complicated. How did Salafis come to adopt this particular conception of flaunting, why did they turn to gender segregation to prevent it, and how did this move constitute a rupture with a longer history of Islamic interpretation and practice?
Setting the Stage
Salafi debates over mapping public space in 1970s Egypt emerged out of the Islamic legal tradition even as they both contributed to and reflected a transformation of Islamic law in the twentieth century. Salafi jurists under Sadat certainly had a body of scholarship on which to draw: previous jurists had sought to minimize the danger of illicit sexual contact and temptation (fitna) that might yield social disorder by laying out clear rules of modesty and gender segregation. Yet, prior to the second half of the twentieth century, gender seg- regation was a marginal legal question, with the exception of ritual spaces in which this division was observed. Even in the abstract, jurists did not articulate a comprehensive vision of gender-segregation. Instead, their focus was on controlling particular modes of interaction (particularly illicit sexual relations) between men and women, rather than on controlling the public space as a male domain.17 Within the legal literature, the subject of a woman's pudendum (ʿawra) was traditionally addressed in either the section on prayer (al-ṣalāt) or ritual purity (al-ṭahāra).18 Indeed, Sunni jurists, though they discussed illicit sexual relations at length,19 did not seek to restrict women's access to public space more generally. Similarly, the eponym of Wahhabism, Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1791), wrote little about this question: enjoining good and forbidding evil, the broader imperative under which the question of preventing gender mixing would have fallen, was a marginal element of this leader's quest to purify Arabia in the 18th century.20
This is not to suggest, however, that jurists accepted gender mixing. Egyptian scholars often feared popular preachers and storytellers (quṣṣāṣ) because their audiences were rarely gender-segregated.21 Similarly, the Maliki Cairene jurist Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 737/1336-7) sought to restrict the circulation of Muslim women in public, particularly in settings in which they were likely to mix with unrelated men.22 Notwithstanding these key exceptions, these jurists were not focused on women's presence in public.
The growing legal focus on modesty in the regulation of public morality arose in the late nineteenth century alongside a broader shift in the social role of Islamic law. Formerly a tool of the scholars in explicating God's intentions, 17 Judith Notwithstanding both the increasing centrality of Islamic law to religious identity and the expansion of women's public presence, Egyptian Salafi scholars did not initially present a comprehensive blueprint for the gendering of public space. The peripheral status of this question in the early twentieth century is illustrated by the main work of Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya founder Muḥammad On the other hand, al-Subkī showed little concern with the broader implications of female presence in public. This was not because women remained within the home during this period; instead, the early twentieth century was witness to women's participation in mass political demonstrations, most notably in 1919.27 Nonetheless, though his nine-volume legal compendium enumerates the requirements of female modesty in the section on prayer (bāb al-ṣalāt),28 he did not deal with flaunting (al-tabarruj) directly, even when commenting on Q 33:33. Similarly, al-Subkī's concern with gender mixing (alikhtilāṭ) centers on proper gender division during the circumambulation of the Kaʿba during the Ḥājj.29 The question of female education, an elite pursuit in early twentieth century Egypt, is mentioned briefly in the section on funerals (bāb al-janāʾiz) where al-Subkī reaffirms the right of women to literacy.30 Though al-Subkī certainly did not support women circulating freely in public, regulating women's roles therein was not the relevant question at this time.
It was only during the 1950s and 1960s that Salafi thinkers began to devote greater interest to the public position of women as it related to modesty and interaction with men. Al-Albānī's 1951 book, Ḥijāb al-Marʾa al-Muslima fī-lKitāb wa'l-Sunna (The Muslim Woman's Hijab in the Quran and Sunna), laid out the laws that govern female public modesty in an effort to regulate the increasing presence of women within public space. Unlike al-Subkī, al-Albānī was concerned with women's presence outside of ritual contexts. In contrast to those who would subsequently cite his writings, however, he was not particularly concerned with gender mixing and did not attempt to draw a connection between immodest dress and social disorder. Instead, his focus was on the preservation of femininity and a woman's access to Paradise. The younger Khaṭṭāb included a four-page footnote expanding on his father's support for female education, specifically within gender-segregated educational institutions (such as single-sex primary schools) or in fields such as medicine that require female practitioners to tend to women. At the same time, however, he rejected the presence of women in government offices or high political positions,35 and described co-educational institutions as an "unlawful innovation" (bidʿa).36 Indeed, Khaṭṭāb has no doubt that, had the Prophet Muḥammad known the danger of gender mixing, he would have forbidden women from attending prayers at the mosque.37 This expanded footnote showcased an increasing Salafi concern with responding to new sites of female mobility.
While Khaṭṭāb was not alone in these concerns, his companions were not fellow Salafis but rather Muslim Brothers. wrote two books laying out guidelines to preserve female chastity (al-ʿiffa) and dignity (al-karāma) on public transportation and in educational and professional settings.40 The question for these Brothers was not whether their sisters would move outside the home, but how. Both the Brotherhood focus on public morality and the emergence of nascent Salafi claims to public space were shaped by Nasserist State Feminism, in which women were both objects and agents of development.41 The centrality of women to Egyptian nationalism was not new: the female body had served as a site of nationalist battles under the British occupation (1882-1923) and the Monarchy ). Yet, the body was recruited to new ends under State Feminism. As Laura Bier notes, "[I]t was the unveiled and active presence of women in an outer sphere of progress that marked the Nasserist public sphere as modern, secular, and socialist."42 Conversely, managing this female presence became the new challenge.
The challenge emerged because the entrance of Egyptian women into public life, particularly the work force, aroused male anxieties over professional and domestic authority. The extension of education to females led to a threefold increase in primary school enrollment,43 while expanded employment of women, particularly as primary and secondary educators and civil servants, challenged men's economic centrality.44 In both instances, this shift was largely urban; the presence of women in "public" workspaces -particularly agricultural fields -was a longstanding economic reality of rural life in Egypt.
These urban anxieties could only be assuaged through veiling. Though State Feminism rejected sartorial veiling as a form of "reactionary traditionalism," it trumpeted the "veiling of conduct" to relieve the tensions of mixed work- spaces.45 This approach to veiling as a "performative boundary"46 preceded the public performances of piety that came to characterize the Islamic Revival of the 1970s, yet is tied to them, both spatially and ideologically. As the 1970s arrived, Salafi writers would seek to answer the tripartite challenge of the longterm entrance of women into Egyptian public life, Nasserist State Feminism and, finally, the political challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood, by articulating a gendered vision of public space that moved beyond existing legal precedents.
In the process, these Salafi authors inaugurated a shift that would radically alter women's legal position as public participants.
From Public Modesty to Political Competition
Niʿmat Ṣidqī's 1971 pamphlet, al-Tabarruj, inaugurated a decade of Salafi debates over the social implications of women in public. Ṣidqī, whose writings were read by women and men alike, particularly within Anṣār al-Sunna, claimed that Egyptian women were exposing themselves on the beach, in the street and within public institutions. She argued that such female flaunting and male apathy to controlling it was the premier threat to public morality. In this "sea of forbidden pleasures" (baḥr al-ladhdhāt al-muḥarrama),47 how could society remain Islamic? If Ṣidqī and Khatṭṭāb agreed that flaunting had produced a social crisis, the question of how to solve this crisis was unclear. Such debates were relevant because of the new religious opportunities of the Sadat era (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . For the first time, Salafi men and women could explore what a project of public morality centered on female modesty might look like in practice. This shift in political policy dovetailed with popular outpourings of religiosity, Muslim and Christian alike, following the disappointment of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the euphoria of the early crossing of the Bar Lev line in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.48 Salafi elites responded to and sought to define these popular practices.
These initial debates reproduced the prominence of women as a key site of cultural authenticity as envisioned by early twentieth century writers, scholars and laymen alike, even as they incorporated the paradoxical pairing of State Feminism in which the woman's public role was both dangerous and central. It was in this context that law -or, more accurately, unenforceable legislative prescriptions -reemerged as a key site of Salafi activism. This was not, however, law as it had been envisioned by the al-Azhar Fatwa council, let alone by earlier jurists. Instead, the nascent legal architecture of gender segregation depended not on the state's coercive power, but on the ability of Salafi scholars to persuade their audience through magazines. The solution offered for the crisis of public morality during the early 1970s was largely one of individual modesty. This can be read both as a continuation of earlier Salafi thought (most prominently that of al-Albānī) and as a reaction to State Feminism, which presented a feminine ideal of modesty sans sartorial veiling. Salafi scholars faced not only the challenge of State Feminism but also that of scholars within the state ranks who challenged their position. Most notably, Sheikh Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Baqūrī (d. 1985) argued that the obligation to veil in any form was specific to the Prophet's family (bayt al-nabī) and thus was not incumbent on Muslim women more broadly. Indeed, Islam permitted women not only to show their heads and limbs but also to travel independently outside the home.49 Yet, if opposition to al-Baqūrī was unanimous among Salafi (and Brotherhood) writers of this period, this was where the consensus ended.
One internal division among Salafis was whether a woman's face should be classified as pudendum (ʿawra): al-Albānī50 and al-Sayyid Sābiq51 rejected this claim, the latter citing the former in doing so.52 By contrast, Niʿmat Ṣidqī argued that both the face and the hands fall into this category.53 Al-Iʿtiṣām's mufti, Aḥmad ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr (d. 1990), fell somewhere in between these two positions, arguing that the niqāb is situational: if a woman adorns her face and hands for her husband (presumably with makeup) and then wishes to leave the house, she must cover them, since she has rendered these otherwise publicly-permissible body parts a temptation (fitna) to other men.54 Despite disagreements over the legal status of a woman's face, participants in these debates assumed individual modesty in public to be sufficient. At the beginning of the 1970s, the question was not whether women would be in public but how they would preserve their modesty as they inevitably traversed heterosocial public space. Ṣidqī, while maintaining a position of stringency on the face veil, assumed that individual piety was sufficient protection for these women from the "corruption" (fasād) around them and that female mobility within these bounds represented no broader social threat.55 A similar assumption was made in early discussions in al-Iʿtiṣām: a Jumādā al-Thāniyya 1390/August 1970 fatwa from Aḥmad ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr instructs a male reader that it is permissible to marry a woman who works so long as she is employed in a "profession that befits her" (fī mihna tunāsibuhā), covers her body (excluding her face and hands) and is never alone with unrelated men.56 The specter of men and women occupying the same professional space was not a central concern.
That individual modesty was sufficient to maintain public morality does not mean that Salafi writers gave free rein to female participation in public institutions and ritual spaces. As explained by Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥamīd (d. 1402/1982), President of the High Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia in the Rabīʿ al-Awwal/March 1976 issue of al-Tawḥīd, women are unfit to serve as judges or to lead men in prayer; the issue, in both cases, is that these positions would grant women undeserved authority (wilāya) over men.57 Within these restrictions, women might traverse public space with the accompaniment of a male relative (dhū maḥram).58 While such strictures did not facilitate female mobility, neither did they cast such mobility as a threat.
What changed during the second half of the 1970s and how was public space redefined? The 1970s certainly witnessed further congestion of public space. Between 1947 and 1976, Egypt's population had grown from 18.8 million to 36.6 million and this growth was primarily urban: the percentage of the Egyptian population living in cities rose from 33 to 44 percent, and the number of urban inhabitants from 6.2 million to 16.1 million.59 The number of students enrolled in higher education grew even more rapidly, increasing from one to four million between 1951 and 1976, of which 30.4 percent were women.60 Crucially, these shifts occurred without a proportional expansion of infrastructure. In the university setting, the result was overcrowded lecture halls and classrooms that often were filled by several times capacity.61 On mass transportation, men and women were in increasing proximity to each other, a challenge highlighted by Salafi writers. In an article entitled, "Do Not Oppress Women," Muḥammad Kamāl al-Fiqqī, noted the social danger of men and women mixing on trains, subways and buses.62 As personal space in public decreased, the threat of physical contact increased. But these shifts were not unique to the 1970s and Salafi calls for the expansion of public modesty beyond individual sartorial practice cannot be explained solely or even primarily by increasingly crowded public transportation or classrooms.63 A much more plausible explanation for the call to don the niqāb and to separate men and women is the political competition between Salafis (of both Anṣār al-Sunna and the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya) and the Muslim Brotherhood.64
As noted, the 1970s did not constitute the beginning of Salafi-Brotherhood intellectual interaction or political competition; rather, ties that had developed in the 1960s expanded over the following decade. Under Nasser (r. 1952-1970), rank and file Brothers and Salafis found themselves in closer contact as mosques served as crucial sites of cross-fertilization. Student activist and later Brotherhood leader ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abūʾl-Futūḥ noted in a recent memoir that he frequently attended mosques affiliated with both the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya and Anṣār al-Sunna, in which he also saw key Brotherhood thinkers such as Second General Guide Ḥasan al-Hudaybī and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī.65 (Hādhihi Daʿwatunā) , in which he echoed Brotherhood slogans by declaring that Islam is "religion and state, judiciary and politics, Quran and sword, this life and the world to come."66 While Muslim Brothers had both influenced and been influenced by their Salafi counterparts in the course of mosque-based cross-fertilization, the Brotherhood's reemergence in the mid1970s, signaled by the return of al-Daʿwa to publication, pushed writers in both al-Tawḥīd and al-Iʿtiṣām to redefine their vision of public morality so as to distinguish themselves from their competitors.
As Salafis and Brothers sought to lay claim to the mantle of religious authority, they faced a regime that claimed to be pursuing top-down Islamization67 while simultaneously pursuing an open-door economic policy that occasioned despair over the moral decline of Egyptian society in the face of foreign consumer culture.68 The Brotherhood's advantage as a popular force lay in its religiously-based political program; through the reformation of state and society, everyday life could be rendered "Islamic." By contrast, quietist Salafis (the leading constituency within Anṣār al-Sunna) did not have a political program, yet had to compete with an organization that promised not merely ethical and ritual rectitude but also sociopolitical change. A growing Islamist faction within the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya found itself doubly torn: because the Muslim Brotherhood was the unquestioned premier claimant to Islamism, a successful Salafi claim to Islamism would necessitate a self-differentiation that did not burn bridges with the Salafi commitment to ritual and theological precision. In addition, neither Salafis nor Brothers wanted to challenge Sadat directly at this time; their interests were best served through ostensibly "apolitical" claims and practice. Public morality represented an opportunity for safe yet powerful protest, promising a public reward of authenticity with minimal threat of repression. The basic difficulty for Salafis, however, was that their position on flaunting (tabarruj) and unveiled dress (sufūr) did not distinguish them from the Brotherhood. Rather, the Brotherhood's position on female sartorial piety -that a woman's pudendum (ʿawra) does not include her face and hands69 -would have placed them comfortably within the Salafi mainstream. Though individual Salafi thinkers such as Niʿmat Ṣidqī may have argued that the face and hands are ʿawra and Aḥmad ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr defined the status of these two body parts contextually, there was little difference between al-Albānī's position and that of the Brotherhood. The price of public piety was about to rise as Salafis and Brothers alike sought to lay sole claim to this key marker of authenticity over the second half of the 1970s.70
Law and Public Order
How did Salafi writers seek to compete with the Brotherhood's claim to protect female modesty and on what basis did they justify this shift? As noted, these claims could not emerge out of a set body of precedent. These writers also had to respond to socio-educational inertia: by 1976, there were roughly 1.4 million female university students. Education was both a right bequeathed by the Nasserist social contract and an increasingly broad reality under Sadat.71 For near- ly two decades, Anṣār al-Sunna and the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya had spread their call to return to Islam's foundational sources despite political restrictions, whether in mosques or in print. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood had no comparative opportunity: its leadership had been jailed, its members had been arrested en masse, and its magazine was shut down beginning in 1954.72 With the Brotherhood's return to the national stage and access to independent mosques, Salafis faced a new challenge.
As Salafis turned to questions of public morality through gender segregation, internal divisions emerged. The issue at hand was not a disagreement over the fundamental question of women's presence in public; rather, it was the extent to which gender segregation could be transformed into a discrete and legally binding project: While Anṣār al-Sunna spearheaded an aggressive legalistic campaign to return women to the home, leading figures within the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya largely limited themselves to non-binding recommendations. 73 For reasons both textual and practical, none of the writers who participated in this debate argued against the right of women to education. On the textual front, several hadith reports relating to female education were widely accepted by Salafis.74 Just as importantly, the Salafi vision of motherhood necessitated that mothers be educated so that they could successfully raise their children, both scientifically and morally. As with State Feminism, female education lay at the core of the Salafi initiative even as female presence in public engendered anxiety. One can only speculate as to the basis of this strategy. One possibility lays in the increasing ties between the JS and the Muslim Brotherhood; during the Nasser period, the JS had sheltered Brotherhood members and the 1970s witnessed increased contacts and, allegedly, ideological sympathy between the two groups. For this claim, see Ṣiyām, "al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya wa'l-Jamʿiyyāt al-Ahliyya fī Misr," 130-1. It is thus possible that the JS elites held off from challenging the Brotherhood to the extent that they might have. The continuation of ideological competition and clashes between the Brotherhood and JS, however, also suggest that, pace Ṣiyām, the former had not infiltrated the latter. Instead of arguing against women's education, writers in al-Iʿtiṣām sought a distance-learning model for women. In an article published in Jumādā al-Ūlā 1397/May 1977, ʿĪsā ʿAbduh proposed a "home university" (jāmiʿat al-dār), facilitated by television and radio broadcasts, through which a woman could reach a "scientific level" while remaining in her "religious stronghold."75 These discussions, however, were short-lived and nothing came of this program. Similarly, in the Ramaḍān 1397/August 1977 issue of al-Tawhid, Ibrāhīm Ibrāhīm Hilāl (sic), while upholding the right of women to university education, argued that such education should occur in a private setting in order to avoid gender mixing.76 The question of education was merely the beginning of a Salafi shift towards (re)mapping public space.
Though Ibrāhīm Ibrāhīm Hilāl had echoed ʿĪsā ʿAbduh's proposal for distance learning, he and his colleagues within Anṣār al-Sunna also trained their eyes on working women as they sought to distinguish themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood. In a three-part series in the summer of 1977, entitled "The Necessity of Women Returning to the Home," Hilāl argued against female employment on social, economic and moral grounds. He began with a social argument: women are needed in the home to educate their children, thus protecting not only the welfare of the family, but also, more broadly, the moral and intellectual health of society.77 In August 1977, Hilāl followed up with an economic critique, arguing that female employment in the bureaucracy depresses male wages, thus making it necessary for both men and women to work. He proposed that women withdraw from state employment and, in exchange, the state would raise men's salaries by 50 to 60 percent.78
The issue was not merely social or economic but also moral. As Hilāl argued in September 1977, female employment destabilizes gender relations not only by facilitating illicit sexual contact, but also by placing women under the authority of men other than their husbands.79 This deplorable state of affairs was compounded by the challenge of transportation: Hilāl expressed his concern for "the woman who toils in offices and on mass transit" (al-marʾa al-kādiḥa fī- 
l-dawāwīn wa'l-muwāṣalāt).80
Though these arguments were an extension of previous concerns relating to male/female contact and male social authority, the anxiety had expanded: gender mixing threatened not only husbands but also the broader gendered socioeconomic and moral order, both inside and outside the home. The arguments made by Ibrāhīm Ibrāhīm Hilāl in al-Tawḥīd were in large part echoed by ʿĪsā ʿAbduh in al-Iʿtiṣām. As in the case of distance learning, however, ʿAbduh offered a recommendation rather than a legal prescription. Specifically, ʿAbduh argued that the employment of women to make ends meet within the home harmed both men and women insofar as it limited the ability of women to fully perform their domestic roles while also depressing men's wages.81 The contrast between Anṣār al-Sunna and the Jamʿiyya Sharʿiyya was even starker when it came to the latter's female participants. Most notably, Zaynab ʿAwaḍ Allāh Ḥasan, who edited the magazine's "Muslim Woman's Corner" (Rukn al-Marʾa al-Muslima), argued that female employment as teachers and nurses "brought only good to society" (mā yaʿūd ʿalā al-mujtamaʿ illā biʾl-khayr). But this was hardly a carte blanche justification for female employment: Ḥasan conditioned such work on limited domestic responsibilities (whether due to not having children or having relatives who could help care for these children) and adherence to "limits" (ḥudūd) of modesty while in public.82 In the latter respect, Ḥasan upheld Ṣidqī's legacy, yet she was a minority voice, in both gender and substance. Notwithstanding this vulnerability, Ḥasan had one advantage: many women who were already employed derived both personal satisfaction and a measure of economic independence from their activities. 83 The case for segregation soon moved forward, propelled not only by Egyptian Salafis but also by a Saudi scholar, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, writing in al-Tawḥīd. Perched at the top of the Saudi Arabian religious hierarchy, far from the economic challenges of working-class Egyptians, Ibn Bāz showed little sensitivity to the practical obstacles that his proposal might face. He likely was sensitive, however, to the religious tensions of his home country: the Saudi religious establishment and the royal family had struck a deal in the early 1960s to provide 80 Ibid., 42. a religious sanction for new technologies (radio and television) and female education in exchange for greater say regarding female sartorial practice and gender relations.84 Ibn Bāz would soon push this bargain further in a distinctly new context.85 As Ibn Bāz advocated domestic confinement, he faced interpretative challenges, foremost among which was the absence of clear proof texts in the Quran and Sunna that forbid gender mixing in public space. What was needed was an interpretative move that elevated the principle of absolute gender segregation (through domestic confinement) above the claim that modest comportment and dress are a sufficient protection against illicit contact and broader social disorder.86 Instead of merely stressing the important role that the Muslim woman play domestically, Ibn Bāz insisted, based on Q 33:33 (waqarna fī buyūtikuna), that the Quran demands that women remain at home (al-qarār fi-baytihā). Ibn Bāz emphasized that this injunction was inseparable from the warning to avoid flaunting.87 Based on this interpretation, the issue at Though Saudi influence on Egypt-whether specifically on Salafi groups or more generally, on public religiosity-is a common trope, this is not an instance of wholesale "Saudification" of an "Egyptian" debate. Instead, it is a case of a prominent Saudi participating in a debate that was centered in Egypt and largely shaped by Egyptian scholars. Indeed, in this instance, Ibn Bāz may have been exploring the implications of gender segregation in Egypt prior to arguing for this policy within his home country: I was able to locate multiple fatwas that responded to this question in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s and 1990s, but I found no evidence of earlier intervention on this question in Saudi Arabia. 86
Curiously, Ibn Bāz did not adopt an approach, later used by fellow Saudi scholars, which banned gender mixing in public space based on the prohibition of gender mixing during prayer. hand was not merely men and women being alone in an office environment or women dressing immodestly in public. Rather, in order to eliminate the possibility of gender mixing in any context, women must remain at home. Perhaps sensing the limited socio-religious appeal of this argument -after all, lower-and middle-class women in Egypt had long traveled outside the home, whether to work in the fields or to purchase food in cities -Ibn Bāz sought to document the harm of gender mixing. As "one of the greatest paths to illicit sexual relations" (min aʿẓam wasāʾil al-zinā), it would destroy a society and its ethical values.88 This argument, however, was insufficient in Egypt, where women's public presence had increased steadily for half a century due to expanded education and employment. Consequently, this Saudi scholar sought to bolster his case by providing a novel interpretation of the injunction against flaunting in Q 33:33. For Ibn Bāz, "do not flaunt" (lā tabarrajna) referred not to female dress and comportment (as assumed by all the other authors who participated in this debate) but to gender mixing for reasons of work, commerce or travel.89 This vision of domestic confinement, however, had clear limitations.
Ibn Bāz's challenge was not merely the precedent of women working; it was also that these prescriptions for female confinement were economically elitist. As Ibn Bāz, Ibrāhīm Ibrāhīm Hilāl and ʿĪsā ʿAbduh turned against female employment in the mid-1970s, they ignored the relationship between class and modesty. On the one hand, they sympathized with women who traversed the increasingly long distance between home and work by train, trolley or bus. They also called for women to be removed from educational or professional environments that might threaten their chastity or modesty; this was an effort, all suggested, to protect the Muslim woman in the face of manifold threats. Yet, some of the social developments that these writers found so odious -especially gender mixing on public transportation -were hardly an issue for those women who could afford private transportation. Other topics of criticismparticularly female employment -were again no issue for women of means, yet had concrete consequences for women (and families) outside the Egyptian elite. Finally, the vision of a domestically confined woman -one who not only does not work but also does not leave the house for regular errands -was only possible with the help of domestic servants. Ibn Bāz's claim to redefine flaunting was also undercut by Muslim Brotherhood efforts to provide practical solutions for women's presence in public space over the course of 1978, in cooperation with the Islamic Student Movement, al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya (JI). Together, these organizations had secured gendersegregated seating on a set number of train routes, particularly between Cairo and Alexandria, beginning in February 1978, thus protecting female students and workers of limited income who relied on public transportation.90 Similar challenges related to gender mixing awaited university students inside and outside the classroom, and the Brotherhood, again in cooperation with the JI, negotiated with the administration of Cairo University to provide separate spaces for men and women for university events hosted in the university's outdoor stadium.91 The goal of separation was also extended to the classroom: al-Daʿwa boasted that the Faculty of Agriculture at Cairo University now provided separate seating in lecture halls for male and female students and, in the near future, the lectures themselves would be separate.92 These socioeconomic realities and political challenges necessitated a Salafi response.
To Retreat or Press Forward?
The call for Salafi women to return to the home clashed with local realities and with the competing programmatic appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood to provide gender segregation in public spaces. In turn, the tensions that arose from this competition played out not merely in the lives of individual women but also on the pages of al-Tawḥīd. A prominent Egyptian Salafi voice on this topic, Ibrāhīm Ibrāhīm Hilāl, led this shift away from domestic confinement. Following a three-part series of articles in late 1978 on the necessity of women 90 "Tajriba Yajib an Tuʿummam," al-Daʿwa, Jumādā al-Thāniyya 1398/ May 1978, 44-6. It is unclear whether this program was put into broad practice on public transportation or whether it was another proposal that led to the creation of women-only sections on trains and subway cars in Egypt. Outside of a women-only subway car, however, gender segregation remained a minority trend and was never instituted on public buses. Why did an elite-centric vision of social restriction fail to catch on? There are two possibilities, one elite-centered, the other society-centered. As Hilāl noted, Islam places a high value on knowledge (ʿilm) for both men and women, as it distinguishes Muslims from their pre-Islamic predecessors.95 Indeed, such knowledge and education represent Truth (al-Ḥaqq), as contrasted with Falsehood (al-Bāṭil), as manifested in unveiled dress and self-display (al-sufūr wa'ltabarruj). 96 Female education had exposed a contradiction in the Salafi vision of public morality: Women had to be educated, both to fulfill their domestic role and to realize their textually-grounded right to education. At the same time, however, changing definitions of public space -and the technological challenges of a distance-learning, beginning in 1977 -had made female presence in public not merely a luxury but a necessity.
Female education was not just an elite issue and women were in no hurry to give up their mobility outside the home. From his position as president of the Administration for Scientific Studies, Ifta, Daʿwa and Guidance within the Saudi Arabian religious hierarchy, Ibn Bāz probably did not appreciate the grassroots realities of 1970s Egypt. Similarly, ʿAbduh, who was born in Egypt but was by this time a resident of Saudi Arabia, was more concerned with elite level questions of Islamic finance.97 By contrast, Hilāl, an active member of Anṣār al-Sunna and a Professor of Islamic Studies at ʿAyn Shams University's Women's Faculty (Kulliyyat al-Banāt),98 likely witnessed the on-the-ground challenges faced by pious women from the Anṣār al-Sunna's network of mosques and charitable associations, on the one hand, and activism of the JI, on the other. 99 Indeed, the prominence of women within the JI's activities underscores the ways in which Salafi women within this group regarded the performance of female modesty as not only a right but also a distinct contribution. As in State Feminism, women were both objects and agents of transformation; what was non-negotiable was their presence in public space. Within the JI, some women held Muslim Brotherhood sympathies while others supported a wide array of Salafi organizations. All had taken on pious garb -and in the case of many Salafi women, a stringent interpretation of modesty that included covering the face with the niqāb -and used sartorial choice to challenge the claims of the Egyptian state to define the feminine body and public life. In light of previous efforts by male Salafi scholars to restrict women's appearance in public, however, it appears that it was not only the Sadat regime that these women challenged but also Salafi elites.
It is perhaps for this reason that, by the early 1980s, the discussion of female modesty came to resemble Niʿmat Ṣidqī's original call to Egyptian women to abide by Salafi gender norms, albeit with a greater emphasis on avoiding gender mixing. In a November 1981 article, al-Tawḥīd 's Ṭahā Nāṣir returned to discussing requirements of women's clothing, almost as though female seclusion was off the agenda.100 A crucial change, however, had occurred: gender segregation within public space was now broadly acknowledged as a key means of facilitating public morality. At the same time, though, exceptions abounded. Most notably, al-Iʿtiṣām frequently justified particular instances of gender mixing under the principle of the "Common Good" (al-maṣlaḥa al-'āmma): as longtime mufti Aḥmad ʿĪsā ʿĀshūr explained, this principle made licit an act that otherwise would be forbidden in order to safeguard the interests of Mus-lims (maṣāliḥ al-muslimīn).101 Accordingly, it was licit for a man to look at an unrelated woman in "situations of necessity or pressing need" (fī ḥālāt alḍarūra aw al-ḥāja al-muliḥḥa), such as medical treatment, court testimony or financial transactions.102 Similarly, another mufti in al-Iʿtiṣām, Aḥmad Najīb al-Mutīʿī, cited the same principle to justify a male doctor looking at a female's body.103 The magazine did not counsel a return to the home, even in cases of sexual harassment: the Rabīʿ al-Awwal/February 1980 issue of al-Iʿtiṣām featured the story of a female student who had turned to Islamic dress -whether she wore the ḥijāb or niqāb is not specified -to escape sexual harassment and found that "she felt comfort and calm in the university and in the street and on public transportation … people began to respect her and treat her politely."104 Women were in public to stay and, if Salafi elites were to successfully compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for a popular audience, they had to adapt to this reality.
Conclusion
The commitment of leading Salafis in Egypt to gender segregation in public emerged in the 1970s due to the long-term entrance of women into public life, intended and unintended cross-fertilization with both Nasserist State Feminism and the Muslim Brotherhood and, finally, political competition between Salafis, quietist and Islamist alike, and the Muslim Brotherhood during the second half of the 1970s. Salafi notions of gender relations, far from representing the natural extension of a particular textual approach or the continuation of previous practices of piety and gender segregation, emerged out of the efforts of elites, particularly members of Anṣār al-Sunna, to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood for the mantle of religious authenticity and public piety in Sadat's Egypt. This shift was no flash in the pan; instead, the Salafi project of public gender segregation continues to distinguish it from the Muslim Brotherhood's support for female candidates and grassroots female activism. By casting light on the political, social and economic factors that both stimulated and chal- Equally important, the negotiation of textual interpretation and social change in Salafi periodicals suggests new pathways for the study of contemporary Salafism through mass media. In contrast to previous studies that analyze legal continuity and change in fatwa collections that have been edited to provide a clear guide to religious practice, this article shows how periodicals provide a dynamic lens through which to observe both intra-elite negotiation and the performance of everything from prayer to the cultivation of a Salafi beard. Indeed, these texts are the tip of the iceberg: contemporary Salafi scholars use satellite television channels and websites to communicate with a transnational community of followers and to compete for influence with their fellow scholars, Salafi and non-Salafi. As with Salafi periodicals and pamphlets, these sources provide new opportunities to observe the intellectual and social ferment of contemporary Salafism as the intersection of text, scholarly competition and local practice.
